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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1

Was the award of attorney's fees and costs to

Defendant/Respondent William Turner proper under Section 78-275 (•

- ^'' "J

( f

2o

If so, is the amount of attorney's fees proper in that

the award included Defendant/Respondent William Turner's fee for
pursuing his Counter Claim?
3•

Did the trial court err in not awarding Plaintiff/

Appellant J. Rodney Dansie's attorney's fees under Section 78-2756, U.C.A.?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
This case is governed by Section 78-27-56, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended and by Rules 59 and 60, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff/Appellant filed suit against six (6)
individual Defendants, including Defendant/Respondent William
Turner, alleging that the Defendant's have battered, assaulted
and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon both of the
Plaintiffs/Appellants. (R.2-6).

In addition, the

Plaintiffs/Appellants sought punitive damages against all
Defendants. (R.6).

The Defendants filed counterclaims for

defamation of character, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, intentional infliction of emotional harm, malicious
abuse of process, and assault. (R.23-37).

The majority of

Defendants' counterclaims were dismissed upon Plaintiff's/
Appellant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment prior
to trial. (R.274).

The Defendant/Respondent William Turner,

2

maintained his counterclaim for assault through the conclusion of
his testimony at trial. (T.R.12).

In chambers and without a

record, Defendant/Respondent William Turner's counterclaim was
withdrawn. (This was never told to Plaintiff/Appellant).

The

Honorable Leonard H. Russon directed a verdict of no cause of
action as to the Defendant/Respondent William Turner, (T.R.12)
and the jury after a six day trial found no cause of action as to
the other Defendants. (R.332-338).
The Defendants made a motion for attorney's fees, pursuant
to Section 78-27-56, U.C.A., seeking $24,576.30 for Defendant
Kenneth Norton (George T. Naegle, Esq.) and $4,587.35 each for
Defendants John Thomas, Joe Totorica, Respondent William Turner
and Thomas B. Shirley for a total of $18,349.40 (as per affidavit
of Larry R. Keller) for a grand total of $42,925.70. (R.452-461).
The Plaintiffs made a similar motion under 78-27-56, U.C.A.,
seeking $30,170.75 against the Defendants. (R.484).

Judge Russon

granted the motion as to Defendant/Respondent William Turner
only, and awarded judgment for $4,587.35 in legal fees and
$421.37 in costs against Plaintiff/Appellant J. Rodney Dansie,
based upon Section 78-27-56, U.C.A. (bad faith), and denied the
other motions including Plaintiff/Appellant J. Rodney Dansie's
motion.

No findings of fact or conclusions of law were prepared.

(R.510).

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
L

On or about December 21, 1988, Rod Dansie and Tiffany

Dansie filed a Complaint against the Defendants.

The Complaint

was prepared and filed by the law firm of McMurray, McMurray,
Dale & Parkinson. (R.2-7).
2.

On or about January 20, 1989, the Defendants John C.

Thomas, Joe Totorica, Elvira Totorica, Kenneth Norton, William
Turner, and Thomas B. Shirley, filed a Counterclaim in the aboveentitled matter alleging that Plaintiff Rod Dansie assaulted
them, was guilty of malicious abuse of process, had intentionally
inflicted emotional distress upon them, had negligently inflicted
emotional distress upon them, and was guilty of defamation of
character by the filing of Plaintiff's lawsuit. (R.23-38).
3.

By letter dated March 1, 1989, Rod Dansie advised his

homeowners insurance carrier, Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company,
of the Counterclaim and requested coverage and defense of the
Counterclaim.
4.

Because the Counterclaim included a claim for negligent

infliction of emotional distress, Utah Farm Bureau agreed to
defend the Counterclaim pursuant to a "reservation of rights."
5.

By letter dated May 17, 1989, Utah Farm Bureau assigned

the matter to its insurance defense counsel, Morgan & Hansen and
retained Morgan & Hansen to defend the Counterclaim.

Morgan &

Hansen entered their appearance as co-counsel for Plaintiffs on
June 7, 1989. (R.87).
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6.

As discovery progressed, it became apparent that it

would be necessary to present Plaintiff's version of what
actually happened in order to properly defend the Counterclaim.
So as to avoid duplication of effort and with the consent of
Plaintiff and his insurer, Utah Farm Bureau, it was agreed that
Morgan & Hansen would be sole counsel for Plaintiff and present
his case and version of what happened in connection with its
defense efforts.
7.

On or about October 23, 1989, Defendants Joe Totorica,

Elvira Totorica, and John C. Thomas made a Motion for Leave to
Amend their Counterclaim to include a Sixth Cause of Action for
Malicious Prosecution. (R.117-120).
8.

On or about October 27, 1989, Defendant Kenneth Norton

joined in that Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaim to include
a Sixth Cause of Action for malicious prosecution. (R.142,143).
9.

On or about November 15, 1989, by Minute Entry, the

Court ruled that Defendants' Motion to Amend their Counterclaim
to allege a cause of action of malicious prosecution be denied
for the reasons set forth in Plaintiff/Appellant's Response
Memorandum. (R.146).
10.

On or about January 2, 1990, Plaintiff/Appellant

submitted a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asking that the
Counterclaim of the Defendants/Respondents be dismissed. (R.214229) .
11.

On January 22, 1990, the Court, in response to said
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Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dismissed Defendant/
Respondent's counts for malicious abuse of process, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress and defamation of character.

The Court

allowed the assault cause of action to go forward to trial.
(R.271-275).
12.

The Defendant Kenneth Norton withdrew his counterclaim

for assault the day that trial began.
13.

The Defendant William Turner withdrew his counterclaim

for assault following his direct examination and the majority of
Plaintiff's cross-examination of him.
14.

Following a six-day trial, the jury returned a no

cause-of-action verdict with respect to the counterclaim for
assault of the Defendants Joe Totorica, Elvira Totorica, John
Thomas, and Thomas B. Shirley. (R.395-405).
15.

Plaintiff had an open offer to Defendants from the

conclusion of the trial to not pursue costs or attorney's fees if
the Defendants would not pursue costs or attorney's fees. The
Court said it to be in the best interests of all parties
concerned that this matter be brought to a conclusion without
further action tending to aggravate the open wounds between the
parties.

Defendants rejected Plaintiff's offer, insisting that

Plaintiff also must agree to stay out of the High Country Estates
subdivision and to contract out all work of operation of the
Foothills Water Company which necessitates Mr. Dansie entering
the subdivision.
6

16.

In spite of this Court's counsel and advice to "bury

the hatchet," counsel for Defendants are insistent on pursuing an
award of attorney's fees in this matter. (T.R.17-19).
17.

All parties, including the Defendants, were represented

by lawyers retained by insurance companies, by reason of their
homeowners policies of insurance.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The emmense weight of evidence, as set forth in this brief,
establishes that Respondent's counterclaims against Mr. Dansie
were brought in bad faith and were without merit, therefore, the
appellant should be awarded attorney's fees. (Sec. 78-27-56,
U.C.A.).
The trial court abused it's descretion when it awarded
attorney's fees to Respondent William Turner, since there was not
sufficient factual evidence on the record to justify and meet the
required elements set out by the Supreme Court of Utah in Cady
v. Johnson, (671, p.2d 149, Utah 1983) to allow the trial court
to award attorney's fees. (Sec. 78-27-56, U.C.A.).
The facts in the record simply do not support the elements
necessary to find that the Appellant's claims against Defendant
William Turner, were meritless and were brought in bad faith.
Appellant's conduct did not rise to a level of lack of good
faith.

There was no evidence that Appellants lacked an honest

belief in their claims, that they had an intent to take an
unconsionable advantage of Defendants, nor that they had intent
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to or knowledge that their suit would hinder, delay or defraud
Defendants.
At the very least, in light of the fact that the jury called
the case a "draw" and no one won and in light of the fact all
parties had insurance representation, and Plaintiff's claim and
Defendants' counter claim resulted in no course of action, each
party should be required to bear his or her own fees and costs.
This is what the trial court counseled at the conclussion of the
trial. (Ct. p.16-19).

The Court awarded attorneys fees to

Defendant/Respondent Turner and the Court should also award
attorneys fees to Appellant, since Mr. Turner's counter claims
were dismissed and Defendant's award of fees included attorney's
fees to pursue those counter claims.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 78-27-56
As adequately set forth in Defendant Kenneth Norton's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion for
Attorney's Fees, (R.444-448), in order to recover for a bad faith
filing under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56, as interpreted
by case law, the moving party must establish
was without merit; and
faith.

Cady

in Cady

v.

v.

(1) that the action

(2) that the action was brought in bad

Johnson, 671 p.2d 149 (Utah 1983).

The Court

Johnson, (supra), made it very clear that just

because a party prevails in a lawsuit does not mean that that
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party is entitled to attorney's fees under UCA Section 78-27-56.
(R.444-448).

The Court stated as follows:

"The statute is narrowly drawn. It was not meant
to be applied to all prevailing parties in all
civil suits."
Id. at 151.
With respect to the first standard, that the action be
"without merit," the Court stated in Cady

v.

Johnson, (supra),

that "the term implies bordering on frivolity."

The dictionary

definition of "frivolous" is "of little weight or importance,
having no basis in law or fact."

Id. and Add. #A p.593.

Following the presentation of Plaintiff's/Appellant's case
at trial, Defendants/Respondents made a Motion for a Directed
Verdict on all counts. (T.R.10).

The Court granted

Defendants/Respondents' Motion for a Directed Verdict with
respect to William Turner and with respect to the claim of
assault on behalf of Tiffany Dansie against the
Defendants/Respondents Joe Totorica, Elvira Totorica, Thomas B.
Shirley, and Kenneth Norton.

Otherwise, the Motion for directed

verdict was denied. (T.R.10).
A directed verdict is only appropriate when the Court is
able to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable minds would
not differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence
presented.

Management Comm.

896 (Utah 1982).

v.

Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 p.2d

The Court determined that sufficient evidence

was presented, except in those areas mentioned above, for
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Plaintiff's/Appellant's case to go to the jury.

Defendants/

Respondents have offered no case law to support their position
that in spite of the fact that their Motion for Directed Verdict
was denied, attorney's fees should be awarded under UCA, Section
78-27-56.

Such a position is contradictory on its face.

How

could a claim be "without merit" when sufficient evidence was
presented to send the claim to the jury?

Certainly, with respect

to those claims that survived Defendants'/Respondents' Motion for
Directed Verdict, Defendants'/Respondents' Motion for attorney's
fees should be denied, it being impossible for the Defendants/
Respondents to meet the first requirement of such a statutory
award.

(Add. #A, p. 593-609, Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith,

Meritless Actions).
Even in the event of the granting of a directed verdict, the
conclusion does not necessarily follow that the claim was without
merit.

Plaintiff/Appellant was proceeding on the theory that the

group of Defendants/Respondents committed an assault on him and
his daughter, and thereby also intentionally caused emotional
distress.

Assault is committed by a person acting with the

intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another
person or to create an imminent apprehension of such a contact
and the other person is thereby put in such imminent
apprehension.

A person commits the tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress or where any reasonable person
would have known that such would result and his or her actions
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are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous or
intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality.

It stands to reason that if

you join together with a group of people in a mob action and
march down toward the victims in an angry manner, screaming and
yelling and making threats, you are more likely, as a group, to
cause immediate apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact
and emotional distress than if you acted alone.

Being involved

in such a mob action certainly makes the acts more outrageous an
intolerable. (Add. #A, p.598-599).
Pursuing such a legal theory which would amount to a logical
extension of the case law in the State of Utah should not be
punished by an award of attorney's fees.

The theory was

warranted by existing law or constituted a good faith argument
for the extension of existing law (see Rule 11, URCP).

To punish

a plaintiff for attempting to pursue a good faith argument for
extension of the existing law would run counter to the American
legal system which is built upon the careful development of the
law through the case law approach.

It would be the "death knellSf

to our present legal system if every plaintiff who tried to
pursue the broadening of legal theory was punished under a bad
faith statute. (Add. #A, pp. 599-602) «,
Even with respect to the Defendant/Respondent William
Turner, Plaintiff's/Appellant's testimony brought him within that
group of individuals Plaintiff recognized as having surrounded
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him in front of his truck.

Even though Mr. Turner did not stand

face to face with Mr. Dansie, he chose to join the group, adding
to the aura of fear.

He stated to Mr. Dansie, according to Mr.

Dansie's testimony, "We've got you now, Rod."

Clearly, Mr.

Turner was an active participant in the group assault.
(T.R.3,4).
Even if the Court determines that the claims that were
dismissed upon Defendants '/ R e s P o n dents' Motion for a Directed
Verdict were without merit, the requirements of UCA, Section 7827-56 have still not been met. (Add #A, p.601,602).

In Cady

v.

Johnson, the Court determined that the plaintiffs there had no
legal basis for recovery but went on to state that even if the
claim was without merit, the trial court must also find that
plaintiff's conduct in bringing his suit was lacking in good
faith.
v.

Cady

v.

Johnson, 671 p.2d 149, 151.

The Court in Cady

Johnson, adopted the Washington Supreme Court's definition of

"good faith" as follows:
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the
activities in question; (2) No intent to take
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) No
intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the
activities in question will hinder, delay or
defraud others.
The Court went on to state that to establish lack of good faith,
one must prove that one or more of these factors is lacking.

Id.

(Add. #A, p.599-603).
There was no evidence at trial that Mr. Dansie did not have
an honest belief that William Turner assaulted him and

12

intentionally caused him emotional distress.

Mr. Dansie

testified that Mr. Turner was within close proximity to him and
made the comment, "We've got you now, Rod." (T.R. p.4). There
was no evidence to indicate that Mr. Dansie named Mr. Turner with
the intent to take unconscionable advantage of him*

Such would

certainly be the case had Mr. Turner not joined with the group in
coming down to participate in the "group assault." (T.R. p.3).
Mr. Turner's decision to come down and be part of the fray in
spite of the fact that, according to his affidavit testimony, he
knew of Rod Dansie's "background and penchant for violence on
occasion" (C.R.264), should bar his claim for fees. (Add. #A,
p.593-610).
William Turner hardly comes to this Court asking for fees
with clean hands.

On the one hand, he testified that he was

never closer than thirty feet from the Plaintiff, but on the
other hand, in order to promote his Counterclaim, he testified in
his Affidavit that "J. Rodney Dansie's outrageous and
uncontrolled actions, including the waving in a threatening
manner of a pan, placed myself and others in immediate
apprehension that an assault would take place."

(Affidavit of

William Turner, paragraph 2, emphasis added). (R.264).

In

William Turner, we have an individual who was willing to pursue
an obviously frivolous counterclaim for assault, until on direct
examination he discovered the difficulty of maintaining the
position that he had been personally assaulted and yet was never
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close enough to Mr. Dansie to assault him.

At that point, upon

questioning by Mr. Keller as to why he had brought his
counterclaim, Mr. Turner's answer brought to a head this
contradictory and dishonest position as he responded that he did
not know why he had brought the counterclaim for assault.
(T.R.10).

In light of such testimony, it is the Plaintiff who

should be allowed to recover attorney's fees against Mr. Turner,
who according to his own testimony brought a claim for assault
which was without merit and in bad faith. (Add. #A, p.593-610).
The additional count that was dismissed upon directed
verdict was the claim of Tiffany Dansie that she had been
assaulted by the Defendants Joe Totorica, Elvira Totorica,
Kenneth Norton, William Turner and Thomas B. Shirley.

Again,

Plaintiff/Appellant was requesting an extension of existing law
in seeking recovery under a group assault theory.

Although

Tiffany Dansie was in her father's truck, who testified that the
group of people surrounding her father screaming and yelling at
him in an uncontrolled manner, which she had not previously
witnessed, placed her not only in fear for her father's safety
but for her own safety as well.

This mob action was a thin line

away from the breaking point in which serious physical injury
would have been inevitable.

Tiffany Dansie was, by the actions

of the Defendants/Respondents, placed in imminent apprehension of
a harmful or offensive contact and suffered emotional distress by
actions of the Defendants/Respondents which any reasonable person
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would have known would have resulted in such emotional distress
in a thirteen-year-old girl.

Defendants'/Respondents' actions

were outrageous and intolerable in light of the presence of this
young girl.

Defendants/Respondents should have been held

accountable, knowing full well the aura of fear that would be
created by their group action and by the natural sensitivities of
a thirteen-year-old girl.

The group assault theory that Tiffany

Dansie was pursuing was warranted by existing law or constituted
a good faith argument for the extension of existing law and was
not brought "without merit."

Even if the Court deems such a

claim to be without merit, it was not pursued in bad faith and
did not result in any increased cost to the Defendants/
Respondents in defending against those claims that were not
dismissed upon directed verdict. (Add. #A, p.599-601).
POINT II
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANTS WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND WAS
PURSUED IN BAD FAITH, WARRANTING AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT.
Plaintiff's/Appellant's initial Complaint was prepared and
filed on or about December 21, 1988, by the firm of McMurray,
McMurray, Dale & Parkinson.
on January 20, 1989c

An Answer and Counterclaim was filed

Thereafter, by letter dated March 1, 1989,

Plaintiff requested that his homeowner's insurance carrier, Utah
Farm Bureau, cover and defend the Counterclaim.

Utah Farm Bureau

agreed to defend the Counterclaim pursuant to a "reservation of
rights" and by letter dated May 17, 1989, retained its insurance
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defense firm, Morgan & Hansen, to defend the Counterclaim,
Pursuant thereto, Morgan & Hansen entered its appearance as cocounsel for Plaintiff on June 7, 1989.

As discovery progressed,

it became apparent that it was largely a duplicative effort to
have separate counsel with respect to Plaintiff's claims and with
respect to Plaintiffs/Appellant's defense against
Defendants'/Respondents' counterclaims.

Therefore, after

a discussion between Plaintiff/Appellant and their insurer, it
was agreed that since it would be necessary to present
Plaintiff's/Appellant's version of what actually happened in
order to properly defend the Counterclaim, that the law firm of
Morgan & Hansen would be sole counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant and
present his case and version of what happened.

The

Plaintiff/Appellant version of what happened, if believed, would
impeach the Defendants'/Respondents7 credibility as to their
version of what happened as set forth in their Counterclaim and
hopefully result in a no cause of action with respect to their
Counterclaim, which is what the jury so determined.

Thus, Morgan

& Hansen set upon a course of action to defeat
Defendants'/Respondents' Counterclaim.

Depositions of each of

the Defendants/Respondents were taken and a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was prepared and filed, as a result of which all
claims of Defendants/Respondents, except for their cause of
action for assault, were dismissed. (R.271).
Plaintiff/Appellant incorporates his Memorandum in Support
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of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment herein for the
argument that Defendants'/Respondents7 Counterclaim was without
merit and pursued in bad faith.

Defendants'/ Res P ondents '

Counterclaim for malicious abuse of process, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress and defamation of character were all
dismissedc (R.271).

Defendant's/Respondent's attempt to amend

their Counterclaim for an additional cause of action for
malicious prosecution was also denied by the Court. (R.271).
Defendant's/Respondent's bad faith in bringing such claims
was brought out by Mr. Keller in direct examination as each
Defendant testified that he or she only brought their
Counterclaim because of the suit brought by Mr. Dansie. (T.R.10).
In other words, they were motivated by revenge rather than by the
good faith pursuit of claims. (Add. #A, p.597).
The counts in Defendant's/Respondent's Counterclaim that
were dismissed were largely based upon the false allegation that
Mr. Dansie regularly filed lawsuits similar to the one in the
instant case in an effort to harass and intimidate persons who
had challenged his alleged ownership of the water rights and
water delivery system for Hi-Country Estates under circumstances
where such lawsuits had been dismissed as being totally without
merit.
(R.31).

(Defendants//ResPondents/ Counterclaim, paragraph 26).
Upon questioning of each of the Defendants/Respondents

in their depositions, none were able to supply any factual basis

17

for this allegation in that the only suits Mr. Dansie had
previously brought were for collection of unpaid standby fees of
lot owners in the Hi-Country Estates.

This blatantly false theme

was pursued by Defendant's/Respondent's counsel throughout the
trial. (Add. #B, p.1-9).
Even Defendant's/Respondent's claim for assault was exposed
as having been brought in bad faith by testimony at trial.
Sharon Shirley, the wife of Defendant Thomas B. Shirley, who by
all testimony was the individual that Rod Dansie came the closest
to during the pan-waving incident, testified that the whole
incident was a laughing matter which no one took seriously and
that she was never placed in fear for her personal safety as a
result of the incident.

James Schoudel, one of Defendants' key

witnesses, also testified that people were laughing at Mr. Dansie
as he was waving the pan.

And yet, because the Defendants/

Respondents were angry that Mr. Dansie was pursuing his claims in
this matter, they elected to intentionally lie about their own
personal fear of being hit by the pan.

Even though Mr. Thomas,

Mr. Norton, and Mr. Turner, by their own testimony, were never
close enough to have any kind of fear about the pan incident,
they elected to pursue such a frivolous and bad faith claim.

See

the depositions, (R.264), and affidavits of these Defendants.
(T.R.10).

If anyone should be awarded attorney's fees in this

matter, it should be the Plaintiff/Appellant for having to defend
against counterclaims built upon intentional lies propounded
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because the Defendants/Respondents were angry at being involved
in this litigation. (Add. #A, p.602).
Because of the obvious weakness of their position with
respect to a claim for assault by the pan incident, the
Defendants elected to pursue a theory that they had been
assaulted by the vehicle of Mr. Dansie as he pulled away from the
incident. (R.8).

Such a theory was pursued in spite of testimony

that placed all of the Defendants/Respondents, except for Kenneth
Norton, to either side of the truck as it pulled away.

Mr.

Norton, in order to support Mr. Thomas in his claim that he was
simply trying to close the door to keep Tiffany Dansie from
falling out as Rod Dansie pulled away, was compelled to testify
that he stood and watched the entire incident as the truck pulled
away.

He testified that he was not afraid of being run over and

he did not step out of the way even though he was the one
Defendant/Respondent in front of the truck as it pulled away.
In spite of all of the efforts of Defendant's/Respondent's
counsel to attempt to paint the picture that their clients were
innocent victims of Mr. Dansie's "scheme" to set up the incident
in order to pursue his litigation in this matter, the real
evidence clearly shows six Defendants/Respondents willing to lie
based on a belief that their lies were justified because of the
actions and representations of Mr. Dansie.

It was apparent from

the trial that Mr. Dansie was at least sincere in his beliefs and
pursuit of his claims and it was equally obvious that the

19

Defendants//ResPondents/ claims were based solely on revenge
factors rather than based upon truthful pursuit of legitimate
claims, (Add. #A, p.599-602), (Add. #B, p.1-9).
CONCLUSION
In order to recover for a Bad Faith filing under U.C.A.
Section 78-27-56, as interpreted by case law, the moving party
must establishi

(1) that the action was without merit and

(2) that the action was brought in bad faith.

Just because a

party prevails in a lawsuit, does not mean that that party is
entitled to an award of attorney's fees.

The claim was not

"without merit", since it was submitted to the Jury for the group
of Defendants.
The case law is that to establish lack of good faith, one
must prove that one of the three factors discussed in Cady
Johnson, (supra),is lacking.
that Mr. Dansie had:

v.

The evidence at the trial indicated

(1) an honest belief that Mr. Turner

assaulted him and his daughter and intentionally caused emotional
distress, if not alone as part of the mob group.

There was (2)

no intent by Mr. Dansie to take unconscionable advantage of
others and there was (3) no intent or knowledge of the fact that
the activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud
others.

Even if the Court deems such a claim to be without

merit; the claims were not pursued in bad faith and did not
result in any increase of cost to the Defendants/Respondents in
defending against those claims that were not dismissed upon
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directed verdict.

Failure to prevail in the case doesn't

establish bad faith.

The trial court exceeded it's authority in

awarding fees to the plaintiff, William Turner, and not awarding
fees to Mr. Dansie for Turner's frivilous counter claims.

If

anyone should be awarded fees in this matter, it should be the
Appellant for having to defend against counter claims built upon
intentional lies propounded because the Respondants were angry at
being involved in this litigation.
It is respectfully submitted that the great weight of
evidence, as set forth above, affirmatively establishes that the
Defendant/Respondent Counterclaims against the
Plaintiff/Appellant were brought in bad faith and were without
merit, and that therefore the Plaintiff/Appellant should be
awarded his attorney's fees pursuant to UCA, Section 78-27-56.
At the very least, in light of the fact that all parties had
insurance representation, and Plaintiff/Appellant claims and
Defendant/Respondent counterclaims resulted in a no cause of
action, each party should be required to bear his or her own fees
and costs. (Add. #B, p.1-9).
The Appellant did not appeal the special jury verdict due to
the cost of another full-blown trial.

The fact that Appellant

failed to meet his burden of proof does not mean the assault did
not happen, it only means that when the stories were retold, the
jury was not convinced based on the evidence presented.
It certainly does not mean that the assault did not happen
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and that Plaintiff's/Appellant's claims did not have merit
partially in light of the fact in this case where all of the
Defendants and most of the witnesses were people whom the
Plaintiff/Appellant had participated with through a corporation.
This corporation, owned by Appellant, was in collection of legal
debts owed to the small water company with fifty-three (53)
customers.

The water company would be out of business if the

debts were not collected.
The Judge directed a verdict as to Turner, but the jury
decided the case with regards to the other Defendants.

If the

lawsuit against a group of Defendants didn't have merit, the
judge wouldn't have allowed it to go to the jury.
Many of the Defendants and witnesses testified that people
were laughing at Mr. Dansie as he was waving the pan.

No one in

this case won.

"The jury called it a draw" (C.T.18), as stated

by the Court.

The Court counseled, "Hey, let's don't file motion

against each.

Let's don't stick each other with attorney's

fees".

This was the advise of the Court and yet

Respondent/Appellant chose to ask for attorney's fees.
If one side is awarded it's attorney's fees the other side
should also have fees awarded under 78-27-56 U.C.A.
The Court in this case went beyond the law in assessing
attorney's fees to the Appellant and abused it's discussion in
this case.

There simply was not sufficient factual evidence for

assessing attorneys fees to the Plaintiff/Appellant fees under
U.C. annotated 78-27-56.
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Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions*
In Cady v. Johnson,1 the Utah Supreme Court interpreted for
the first time a new Utah statute that allows a court to award attorney's fees for civil actions brought without merit and not asserted in good faith.* In Cady, the supreme court set standards for
lower courts to use in determining whether to award attorney's fees
under the statute.* Although the opinion clearly states that a trial
court must make three distinct findings in order to authorize an
award of attorney's fees,4 the standards set by the supreme court
are somewhat ambiguous. This comment will attempt to clarify the
ambiguities of the court's opinion and make several suggestions for
future application of the statute.
I. BACKGROUND

Utah courts have traditionally adhered to the American rule
that attorney's fees cannot be awarded to a prevailing party in the
absence of a specific statutory provision or an agreement between
the parties.5 That rule is based on the assumption that imposing
costs and expenses on the losing party will discourage citizens from
asserting their legal rights.*
The American rule contrasts sharply with the English practice
of awarding costs, including solicitor's and counsel's fees, to the
prevailing party in a lawsuit.7 Critics of the American rule have
* The author is indebted to Lon Jenkins, a 1983 graduate of the University of Utah
College of Law and former staff member of the UTAH LAW REVIEW. Much of the background
information used in this comment was drawn from an unpublished article written by him.
1. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983).
2. Act of Mar. 23,1981, ch. 13, § 1,1981 Utah Laws 24 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983)).
3. 671 P.2d at 151.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah
1982); Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981).
6. In St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450, 465, 195 P. 305, 311 (1921),
the Utah Supreme Court stated its rationale for adhering to the American rule: "The courts
of this state are always open to all for the redress of grievances and the protection of legal
rights, and in our judgment they should refrain from allowing the imposition of costs and
expenses upon the losing party except such as are provided for by statute . . . ."
7. English courts have awarded counsel fees as a part of costs of litigation since the
promulgation of the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw., ch. 1 (1275). Fees were originally available only to prevailing plaintiffs. A statute was passed in 1607, however, that permitted
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advocated adoption of at least a modified English practice for two
reasons: first, the American rule encourages intolerably congested
courts;8 second, an injured party can never be made whole if he
must pay his own attorney's fees.*
Recognizing that the American rule had inherent problems,
the federal judiciary created exceptions to the rule,10 including the
federal bad faith exception.11 That exception authorizes a court to
award attorney's fees against a party if the court determines that
the party "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."12 Under that exception, bad faith may be found either in actions that led to the lawsuit or in the conduct of the litigation itself.18
Similarly, a number of states have enacted statutes authorizing courts to award attorney's fees in civil actions where one party
acts in bad faith or asserts a frivolous claim.14 Following that
awards to prevailing defendants as well. 4 Jac, ch. 3 (1607). The current English practice
essentially was established by the 1883 rewrite of the Rules of Court. Good hart, Costs, 38
YALE L.J. 849, 851-72 (1929). That procedure requires a special taxing master, after the
conclusion of a case, to determine the amount and appropriateness of costs to be awarded
the prevailing party. For an extensive examination fo the English history of costs, see id.
8. See Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L.
REV. 75, 79-80 (1963). The American rule encourages parties with unfounded or feeble
claims to bring suit in hope of recovering at least the nuisance value of the suit because such
a party risks nothing but the coat of his own attorney's fees. See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792, 797 (1966). Parties
faced with the possibility of being charged with double attorney's fees theoretically would be
deterred from asserting unfounded claims or defenses. See Note, Attorney's Fees: Where
Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1221 (1967) (quoting First Report
of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 11 MASS. L.Q. 7, 63-64 (1925)).
9. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 8, at 792; Note, supra note 8, at 1223. A party who
pays substantial attorney's fees to defend himself against a frivolous suit, or one who must
pay attorney's fees to recover an "airtight claim," has suffered real monetary damage.
10. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939) (attorney's fees may
be awarded as costs in "exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice").
11. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex ret Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974). The other major exception is the "common fund exception," which permits a court
to assess attorney's fees against a common fund that a successful litigant has procured for
the benefit of a class of individuals. Id.\ see Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161,
163-68 (1939).
12. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974) (footnote omitted).
13. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (quoting Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)).
14. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01(0 (1982) (groundless and not in good
faith); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982) (frivolous and not in good faith, but "frivolous" includes "not in good faith"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-101 (Supp. 1982) (frivolous);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West Supp. 1984) ("complete absence of a justiciable issue");
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6F (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1983) (frivolous and not in good
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trend, the Utah Legislature enacted section 78-27-561* in 1981, allowing a court to "award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith.""
II.

DECISION

In Cady v. Johnson,17 the Utah Supreme Court considered
Utah's bad faith attorney's fees statute for the first time. The
plaintiffs18 in Cady had offered their home for sale under a listing
agreement with Telford Realty Company. Rich Edwards, a salesman for All Seasons Realty, prepared a written offer of purchase
that was signed by defendant Jared Johnson for his mother, defendant Reta Johnson. Jared had no written power of attorney to sign
the document for Reta.19 Jared also gave the salesman a $500
check, drawn on his mother's bank account, as earnest money.10
The plaintiffs subsequently vacated their home.11 On the closing
date, the defendants did not appear, and later indicated that they
did not desire to purchase the home.11 The plaintiffs refused to
return the earnest money and instituted suit for additional damages, or in the alternative, for equitable relief for failure to perform
the contract.18
At trial, the plaintiffs' first cause of action was dismissed on
their own motion,14 and their second cause of action was dismissed
pursuant to the statute of frauds.15 The plaintiffs, therefore, were
faith); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.21 (West Supp. 1984) (bad faith claim, frivolous claim, position asserted solely to harass or delay, or fraud upon the court); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-01
(Supp. 1983) (frivolous); Wis. STAT.'ANN. § 814.025 (West Supp. 1983-84) (frivolous, including both bad faith and meritless claims).
15. UTAH CODR ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983).
16. Id, The statute applies in all civil actions "where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement." Id.
17. 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983).
18. Plaintiffs in the case were Jon and Carolyn Cady (the vendors), Telford Realty
and Rich Edwards, a salesman for All Seasons Realty. Defendants were Reta Johnson and
her son, Jared Johnson. Id. at 150.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Plaintiffs decided, on the strength of Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370,
335 P.2d 404 (1959), that because they had retained the earnest money as liquidated damages, they were not entitled to additional damages. See Cady, 671 P.2d at 150.
25. Cady, 671 P.2d at 150; see UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-1 (1976). The vendee's son
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not entitled to damages or equitable relief for breach of contract.16
In addition, the trial court granted the defendants' request for
attorney's fees based on a finding that the plaintiffs had assured
the judge that there would be valid issues for trial, even though
they had no actionable claim.27 The judge concluded that if the
plaintiffs had researched the law, they would have discovered that
their claims were meritless and could have saved the court time by
not pursuing the case.18
The plaintiffs appealed both the summary dismissal of their
second cause of action and the award of attorney's fees.29 The Utah
Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct in dismissing
the second cause of action,80 but vacated the award of attorney's
fees because there was no proof that the suit was not brought in
good faith.81
In vacating the award of attorney's fees, the supreme court addressed the newly enacted section 78-27-56.82 It stated that for an
award of attorney's fees to be made pursuant to the statute, the
trial court must make three distinct findings. First, the party to
whom the fees are to be awarded must prevail.88 Second, the court
must find that the action or defense was "without merit."84 The
supreme court stated that the term "without merit" was synonymous with "frivolous."85 The court then set out the dictionary definition of frivolous—"of little weight or importance having no basis
in law or fact"86—and held that the trial court was correct to find
that the plaintiffs' causes of action were "without merit."87
Third, the trial court must find that an action or defense was
not brought or asserted in good faith.88 The supreme court quoted
Tacoma Ass'n of Credit Men u. Lester," which defined "good
had no written power of attorney to act as her agent in signing the earnest money agreement, so there was no valid contract.
26. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151.
27. Id. at 150.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 151.
30. Id.
31. Id at 152.
32. Id. at 151-52 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 151.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 72 Wash. 2d 453, 433 P.2d 901 (1967), quoted in Cady, 671 P.2d at 151.
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faith" as:
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question;
(2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the activities in
question will hinder, delay, or defraud others.40
To establish a lack of good faith under Tacoma, the trial court
must find by "'sufficient evidence"41 that the party's conduct fails
at least one of those three requirements.41 The court in Cady held
that although better preparation might have disclosed to plaintiffs
that their claims were meritless, failure to adequately research
their case did not constitute bad faith.48 Further, there was no evidence that plaintiffs did not hve an honest belief in their claim,
that they intended to take unconscionable advantage of the defendants, or that they intended to, or knew that their suit would, hinder, delay or defraud the defendants.44 Thus, because no evidence
of bad faith existed, the supreme court overturned the award of
attorney's fees.45
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Attorney's Fees Awards Under Section 78-27-56
Under the supreme court's interpretation of section 78-27-56
in Cady, three elements must be satisfied before a trial court may
award attorney's fees.
L Prevailing Party—First, an award of attorney's fees may
be made only to a prevailing party.46 That element was not dis40. Tacoma, 72 Wash. 2d at 458, 433 P.2d at 904; see Cady, 671 P 2d at 151.
41. Cady, 671 P.2d at 152.
42. Id. at 151 (citing Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d
585 (1971)).
43. 671 P.2d at 152.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983)). In Utah, however, a party
need not prevail on every issue to be considered a prevailing party. For example, in Checketta v. Collings, 78 Utah 93, 102, 1 P.2d 950, 953 (1931), the Utah Supreme Court held that
a defendant who had lost on a counterclaim but not on the original claim was a prevailing
party for purposes of cost assessment. Although the term "costs" usually does not include
attorney's fees, "[wjhere attorney's fees are allowed to the successful party, they are in the
nature of costs and are taxable and treated as such." 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 72 (1965).
Because of this close relationship between cost assessment and attorney's fees awards, the
prevailing party rationale of Checketts should apply to the award of attorney's fees under
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cussed in Cady because the defendants were clearly the prevailing
party.
2. Without Merit—Second, a court must determine that the
action or defense was "without merit."47 The Cady opinion provides an easily understood and applied definition. A claim that is
"without merit" is a "frivolous" claim.48 A frivolous claim is one
with "no basis in law or fact."40 That standard basically makes the
"without merit" determination a question of law;50 therefore, it
should be fully reviewable by an appeals court.51
Although the Cady court cited Can-Am Petroleum Co. v.
Beck** for the proposition that "without merit" means "bordering
on frivolity,"53 the court made it clear later in the opinion that a
claim must be fully "frivolous" to be deemed "without merit."54
The broader standard, "bordering on frivolity," would give a court
greater leeway when determining whether a claim was "without
merit." That broader definition would serve as a greater deterrent
to groundless lawsuits and, in that sense, would better fulfill the
legislature's intent.55 The word "bordering," however, adds greater
subjectivity to the "without merit" determination. The "bordering
on frivolity" standard is therefore more difficult to apply and to
review. The "fully frivolous" standard is better adapted to the
Cady court's objectives: "[I]t adequately serves the purpose of the
section 78-27-56.
47. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (citing UTAH CODB ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983)).
48. Id.
49. Id. To use commonly understood legal concepts, a claim having "no basis in law"
is one that would be properly subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See
FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6). Similarly, a claim having "no basis in fact" would be the proper
subject of a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g.. FED. R. Crv. P. 56.
50. See Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 623 (1943) ("Judgment [under
Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] is authorized only where
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . .").
51. See Automotive Mfr's Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033,
1036 (Utah 1979). Although the decision whether to award attorney's fees under section 7827-56 is within the trial judge's discretion, the issue of whether the claim or defense was
frivolous should be considered a separate question of law. Similarly, the issue of whether a
party has acted in bad faith should be considered a separate question of fact. See infra
notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
52. 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964).
53. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (quoting Can-Am., 331 F.2d at 372) (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 152.
55. One of the purposes of the statute is to reduce congestion in the courts by encouraging settlement. Statement of Rep. Hillyard, Third Reading of H.B. 100, 44th Utah
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 5, 1981) (H.R. Recording Tape No. 6, side 1).
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statute . . . and is clearly understood."6* Parties therefore should
not be misled by the "bordering on frivolity" language in the Cady
opinion; an action or defense must be fully "frivolous" to be held
"without merit.""
3. Bad Faith—Finally, the trial court must find that the losing party's conduct lacked good faith before attorney's fees may be
awarded.** Bad faith*9 conduct may occur during the following two
time frames: The period leading up to a suit and during the suit.*0
A finding of bad faith is based on the subjective intent of the
party, and is usually determined from all of the facts and circumstances of the litigation, rather than from application of any strict
legal test.*1 Thus, the bad faith determination is a question of fact
and should be granted substantial deference on appeal.*1
The Cady court provided guidelines for determining a party's
good faith by setting out the definition of good faith used in Tacoma.** Good faith thus defined consists of these three factors: An
honest belief in the claim; no intent to take unconscionable advantage of the opposing party; and no intent to, or knowledge that the
proceedings, will hinder, delay or defraud the other party.*4 The
Cady court stated that to find bad faith, "sufficient evidence"**
must "affirmatively establish"** that a party failed to satisfy at
least one of those three tests.*7 Although the court's opinion provides those basic guidelines, more explanation is needed.
First, the type of conduct being evaluated to determine bad
faith is unclear from the opinion. Bad faith generally consists of a
party's improper actions or motives that lead to a lawsuit, or improper conduct during the litigation.** The Utah statute indicates
66. Cady, 671 P.2d at 161.
67. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
58. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151.
59. For purposes of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983), the court treats "lack
of good faith" and "bad faith" as synonymous. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151-52.
60. Cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) ('"bad faith' may be found . . . in the
actions which led to the lawsuit [and] in the conduct of the litigation").
61. Cf. Cady, 671 P.2d at 152 ("sufficient evidence" must "affirmatively establish"
that a party has acted in bad faith).
62. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
63. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (quoting Tacoma, 72 Wash. 2d at 458, 433 P.2d at 904); see
supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
64. See Cady, 671 P.2d at 151.
65. Id. at 152.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).

600

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[1984: 593

that for a trial court to award attorney's fees, it must determine
that "an action or defense [was not] brought or asserted in good
faith."89 That language can be interpreted in two different ways.
The word "asserted" could be interpreted as relating only to the
word "defense," and therefore, the party's bad faith must in some
sense motivate the entire action or defense before attorney's fees
may be assessed. That interpretation basically would make section
78-27-56 a statute awarding attorney's fees for malicious prosecution.70 Although the Cady court stated that "the trial court must
. o . find that plaintiffs conduct in bringing suit was lacking in
good faith,"71 the intended reach of the statute seems broader.
That interpretation therefore should be rejected.
Alternatively, the word "asserted" could be interpreted as referring to the party's conduct during the litigation. Under that interpretation, the question of good faith would be divorced from the
"without merit" determination. The court first would determine
whether the action or defense was "without merit" and then determine whether the party's conduct evidenced bad faith either in the
actions or motives that led to the lawsuit,71 or in the conduct of the
litigation.78 That interpretation should be correct because the third
element of the Tacoma test, "no intent to . . . hinder [or] delay
. . . others,"74 seems applicable to conduct during the litigation.
Although the Utah statute is "narrowly drawn,"7* that construction is not unduly broad. The court must still find that an action
or defense is "without merit" and that the litigant acted in "bad
faith."
Second, the factors used to determine when bad faith is present are unclear from the Tacoma guidelines. The Cady court
stated that the evidence must "affirmatively establish" a party's
69. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983).
70. Malicious prosecution is an action for the recovery of damages to person, property or reputation that have proximately resulted from a previous civil or criminal proceeding prosecuted unsuccessfully, without probable cause and with malice. 54 C.J.S. Malicious
Prosecution § 1 (1948). Attorney's fees are normally an element of damages. Id. § 113.
Under Utah law, malice can be inferred fromfilinga complaint without probable cause. See
Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 133, 135, 355 P.2d 714, 716 (1960).
71. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (emphasis added).
72. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983) ("action or defense . . . not
brought . . . in good faith").
73. See id. ("action or defense . . . not. . . asserted in good faith"). This interpretation corresponds to the federal bad faith exception. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752, 756 (1980) (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)).
74. Tacoma, 72 Wash. 2d at 458, 433 P.2d at 904.
75. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151.
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lack of good faith76 and held that mere failure to investigate the
validity of the claim did not show bad faith under the Tacoma
standard.77 Thus, the first clear test estblished by Cady is that
negligent investigation of a claim does not, by itself, show bad
faith.78 Because a party rarely will admit that its motives for litigation are improper,79 courts usually are required to consider surrounding facts and circumstances to make subjective determinations of bad faith.80 Several factors may provide guidance in those
determinations. For example, courts have found bad faith where a
party (1) has been defiant and uncooperative during litigatiorf,81
(2) has been unresponsive to the demands of judicial process,82 (3)
has made motions solely for the purpose of delay,88 (4) has attempted to use judicial process for purposes other than obtaining
the claimed relief,84 or (5) has been "stubbornly litigious."86 Each
76. Id.
77. Id. at 152.
78. See id.
79. But see Ryan v. Hatfield, 578 F.2d 275t 277 (10th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff admitted
before an investigating committee that suit was brought only to obtain defendant's testimony for use in another pending suit); Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (D. Colo.
1978) (defendant's evidence showed that plaintiff admitted his plan to harass defendant by
instituting expensive litigation).
80. See Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951) ("in suit
at equity where taxation of such costs is essential to doing of justice, [attorney's fees] may
be allowed in special cases"); see also Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568, 568
(E.D.N.Y. 1934) (special fact that plaintiff merely lent his name to suit, but was otherwise
uninvolved with the litigation, warranted award under federal bad faith exception).
81. Red School House, Inc. v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 386 F. Supp. 1177,
1193 (D. Minn. 1974).
82. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 755-56 (1980); United States v.
Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 712-13 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.
1976).
83. Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 605 F.2d 35, 40 & n.5 (2d
Cir. 1978).
84. Ryan v. Hatfield, 578 F.2d 275, 277 (10th Cir. 1978).
85. The Utah Supreme Court awarded attorney's fees against a "stubbornly litigious"
party who acted in bad faith in American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486
P.2d 1042 (1971). The fee award in Walker resulted from application of UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-33-10 (1977), which states: "In any proceeding under this chapter [concerning declaratory judgments] the court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable and just."
In Walker, the court interpreted "costs" to include attorney's fees. There, the plaintiff-insurer refused to cover an insured's daughter who was involved in an automobile accident.
The other party to the accident had a writ of garnishment issued to the insurer. Upon receipt of the garnishment, the insurer instituted a declaratory judgment action. At trial on
the garnishment, the insurer was found liable to the insured's daughter. 486 P.2d at 1043.
Additionally, the court awarded attorney's fees against the insurer on the declaratory judgment action. The court reasoned that rather than instituting the declaratory judgment action, the insurer simply could have answered the garnishment and raised its arguments in
that case. The court concluded that the only purpose for. the hasty commencement of the
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of those factors could constitute bad faith under the Tacoma standard, but each provides a more concrete focus for use in making
the bad faith determination.86
J5. Standard of Review for a Bad Faith Finding
A final question raised by the Cady opinion is the standard of
review applied to the trial court's finding of bad faith. Although
the Cady court set out the Tacoma standards as a guideline, the
trial court'sfindingof bad faith necessarily will be based in part on
a determination of the party's subjective intent. That finding is essentially a finding of fact and is fundamentally different from a
finding of frivolousness, which is based on objective legal standards. When the determination is essentially factual, the appellate
court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court.*7 The trial court will be witness to the courtroom conduct of
the party charged with bad faith. The appellate court will have
only the record before it.88 Thus, if the trial judge is left with the
conviction that a finding of bad faith is warranted, applying the
Tacoma standards80 and the factors set out above,00 he should
declaratory judgment action was to harass the plaintiff and force the plaintiff to expend
money on counsel. Inferring that improper purpose, the court awarded counsel fees. Id. at
1044. Walker suggests that instituting a second lawsuit, rather than pursuing the original
lawsuit to its full conclusion, demonstrates bad faith.
It is arguable that Walker applied a less restrictive bad faith standard than is permissible under section 78-27-56. While the court could infer the requisite improper motive, section 78-27-56 also requires a determination that the action was without merit. There is no
indication that the declaratory judgment action in Walker was unfounded; on the contrary,
it clearly seemed to have merit. Therefore, under section 78-27-56, the Walker result may
well have been different.
86. The court presumably would hold that "self-induced myopia" concerning the
merit of an asserted claim or defense would constitue bad faith. See Cady, 671 P.2d at 152
(citing Catanzaro v. Masco Corp., 423 F. Supp. 415 (D. Del. 1976)). "Self-induced myopia,"
however, probably could be inferred only in the most egregious cases. "Self-induced myopia" would seem to require a party to act with a "conscious purpose to avoid learning the
truth." See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 951
(1976). When a person commits a criminal act with such a purpose, coupled with a high
probability of certain facts being true, he can be held to have acted "knowingly." Id. at 700,
704. Afindingthat an attorney had asserted a claim or defense on behalf of his client with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning whether the claim or defense had merit might justify
not only an award of attorney's fees, but also a disciplinary action against the attorney. See
infra text accompanying note 126.
87. General Ins. Co. of America v. Lewis, 121 Utah 440, 441, 243 P.2d 433, 434 (1952).
88. C/. McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978) (due deference should be
given tofindingsof the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses).
89. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text
90. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text
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make a specific statement of his finding and reasons, cast in the
terms of the Tacoma standard. Such a finding should be overturned on appeal only if the trial court abused its discretion.01
IV.

FUTURE ISSUES UNDER SECTION

78-27-56

Several other questions not discussed in Cady are left open by
the new Utah statute.
A.

Partial Attorney's Fees Awards

The first issue is whether a court can award partial attorney's
fees on a finding that one of several causes of action or defenses is
without merit and not asserted in good faith. Section 78-27-56 provides that the court "may" award attorney's fees if the elements of
the statute are satisfied.92 As a matter of statutory interpretation,
use of the word "may" grants courts discretion in applying a provision,*8 suggesting that the court's range of options should be broad
enough to allow a partial award of attorney's fees. If courts are
willing to award partial attorney's fees, unfounded claims and defenses may be removed from court. Because of the stringent requirements that must be satisfied to justify an award under the
statute, however, parties should not be deterred from pursuing legitimate claims and defenses.
Case law on that point is in conflict. One Colorado case that
allowed an award of partial attorney's fees, Morton u. Allied Stores
Corp.*4 was cited in Cady™ That case focused on the Colorado
statutory counterpart to Utah's bad faith attorney's fees statute.96
Under that statute, a court must award attorney's fees if the action
is adjudged "frivolous."97 Courts, however, may use their discretion
when determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded.98
91. Cf. Williams v. Shearwood, No. 18512, Slip op. at 2 (Utah Aug. 15, 1984) (in divorce proceedings, court stated that "(w)ith respect to the award of attorney fees . . . it is
within the discretion of the trial court, on examination of the facte, to determine if the
circumstances warrant an award of fees against one of the parties and in favor of the
other. . . . We will not overturn the award, finding no abuse of discreation").
92. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp, 1983).
93. See AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 22 (1974).
94. 90 F.R.D. 352 (D. Colo. 1981).
95. Cady, 671 P.2d at 151.
96. Morton, 90 F.R.D. at 358; see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-17-101 to 406 (Supp. 1982).
97. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-17-101(1),(3) (Supp: 1982); see Morton, 90 F.R.D. at 358.
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-102(1) (Supp. 1982) ("The court may exercise its discretion in determining whether attorney fees are to be awarded and as to the amount thereof
so that manifest injustice may be avoided'') (emphasis added); see Morton, 90 F.R.D. at
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In Morton, the Colorado Federal District Court determined that
one of two claims asserted by the plaintiff was frivolous, and therefore ordered an award of approximately one-half of the attorney's
fees incurred by the defendant in defense of the suit."
Similarly, under the federal bad faith exception, attorney's
fees for the entire litigation are awarded only if the action is
brought in bad faith,100 or bad faith pervades the entire litigation.101 If the bad faith is found in conduct during the trial, courts
have limited awards "to those expenses reasonably incurred to
meet the other party's groundless bad faith procedural moves."102
Thus, under the federal bad faith exception, partial awards actually may be the norm.
Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton10* indicates the alternative point of view. In that case, an action brought under federal
securities law, the district court stated that the plaintiff was not
entitled to attorney's fees where it was not shown that the "totality" of the defense bordered on frivolity or was made in bad
faith.104 That holding can be distinguished. Under securities law,
no finding of bad faith is required to allow an award of costs and
attorney's fees to a prevailing party.108 A Utah court, however,
must make a specific finding of bad faith before awarding fees
under section 78-27-56.106 That distinction is critical. The Utah
statute is punitive in nature,107 and it is reasonable to punish a
litigant with a partial assessment of attorney's fees when part of an
action is without merit and not pursued in good faith.
The partial award would make the statute much more effective in saving court time. Parties would be encouraged to realistically evaluate the merit of each claim or defense they intend to
368.
99. Morton, 90 F.R.D. at 358. The court determined that manifest injustice would
result if the court awarded the defendant all the attorney's fees incurred in defending the
suit when only one of the plaintiff's claims was frivolous. Id.
* 100. See Browning Debenture Holders Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078,1089 (2d
Cir. 1977).
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124
(4th Cir. 1970) (court of appeals reversed district court's order of summary judgment of the
case in chief).
104. Id. at 1234.
105. 15 U.S.C. | 77k(3) (1982). The suit or defense must have been "without merit."
Id.
106. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1983).
107. Cf. People v. Eatherton, 119 111. App. 3d 174, 456 N.E.2d 327, 330 (1983) (such
statutes are intended to penalize parties who bring frivolous lawsuits).
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argue before a court, and to assert only the valid claims or defenses
available, rather than to use a shotgun approach. Thus, presentation of some cases would be streamlined. At the same time, because the finding of bad faith is required, parties would not be deterred from asserting valid claims. In the short run, determining
whether each cause of action or defense is "without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith"IOi will prolong litigation. Over
the long run, however, substantial time savings may be achieved as
unfoundedxclaims are not pursued. Thus, the statute, case law, and
public policy all indicate that partial awards should be allowed
under the statute.
B.

Awards Assessed Against Attorneys

Another issue raised by the Utah statute and not discussed in
Cady is whether an award of attorney's fees under the statute may
be assessed against the losing attorney rather than his client. Section 78-27-56 allows a court to award attorney's fees to a prevailing
party, but the statute does not specify against whom the award is
to be assessed.109 In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,110 the United
States Supreme Court held that in limited circumstances courts
could assess an award of attorney's fees against opposing counsel
under the federal bad faith exception.111
The lawyers in Roadway unreasonably extended the court proceedings.112 They consistently ignored court deadlines, refused to
answer certain interrogatories, failed to appear for depositions, and
failed to file briefs requested by the district court.118 The court dismissed their class action suit with prejudice114 and assessed attorney's fees against the lawyers.1" Although the specific theory that
the district court used to justify the fee assessment was overturned
108. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-66 (Supp. 1983).
109. Id.
110. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
111. Id. at 764-67. Although Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens did not join in
this portion of the opinion, id. at 764 n.ll, and Chief Justice Burger dissented, id. at 772,
Justice Blackmun joined this portion of the Court's opinion in his concurrence, id. at 769,
giving the Court a majority. Therefore, Part III of the opinion concerning a court's inherent
power to assess fees against an opposing attorney under the federal bad faith exception
constitutes a holding of the Court.
112. See id. at 754-57.
113. Id. at 755.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 756.
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on appeal,116 the Supreme Court upheld the power of courts to assess fees directly against counsel under the federal bad faith
exception.117
There are several reasons why an award against counsel is justified. First, "[t]he power of a court over members of its bar is at
least as great as its authority over litigants."118 State courts also
should have that power.119 Second, an attorney is in a better position than his client to assess the merits of a legal claim because of
his legal training.130 Further, the attorney is generally free to exercise his discretion in the procedural conduct of a trial. Therefore,
in circumstances such as those present in Roadway, it is more appropriate to assess the award of attorney's fees against the losing
party's counsel than against the losing party. The Utah statute is
silent on that question, but the Roadway rationale seems to afford
a sufficient basis for a judge to make such an award under the
proper circumstances.121
C.

Section 78-27-56 and Attorney Disciplinary Action

A third issue raised by the statute and not discussed in Cady
is the relationship between section 78-27-56 and Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A)(l) and (2) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct
of the Utah State Bar.1** Specifically, the question is whether an
award of attorney's fees under section 78-27-56 should provide a
basis for a disciplinary action under Utah's rules of professional
conduct.
First, Cady makes clear that negligent research of a case, by
itself, will not support an award of fees under section 78-27-56.m
116. Id. at 756-57, 767.
117. Id. at 766-67. The case then was remanded to the district court to consider
whether a finding of bad faith was warranted. Id. at 767-68.
118. Id. at 766 (footnote omitted).
119. See id. ("If a court may tax counsel fees against a party who has litigated in bad
faith, it certainly may assess those expenses against counsel who willfully abuse judicial
process").
120. See Comment, Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against Attorneys. Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Piper, 60 B.U.L. REV. 950, 963-64 (1980).
121. Under Rule VII(g) of the Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, an attorney
can be ordered to make restitution for damage caused by his unprofessional conduct. Attorney's fees for bad faith litigation could be assessed against an attorney under that provision
after a disciplinary proceeding. RULES OP DISCIPLINE OP THE UTAH STATE BAR Rule VII(g)
(1979 & 1981). See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
122.

REVISED RULES OP PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OP THE* UTAH STATE BAR DR

102(A)(1) & (2) (1977).
123. Cady, 671 P.2d at 152.

7-
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Under Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2), an attorney is subject to discipline if he "[kjnowingly advance[s] a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, . . . [unless] it can be supported by
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law."124 Although not explicitly stated in the Cady opinion, the conduct of an attorney who knowingly asserts an unwarranted claim would fail both the Cady without merit test11* and
the first element of the Tacoma test because the attorney does not
have "[a]n honest belief in the propriety of the activities irj question."126 Furthermore, if an attorney's conduct is the result of
"self-induced myopia" concerning the merits of his client's claim,
he could be held to have acted knowingly.127 In those situations,
both an award of attorney's fees under section 78-27-56 and a disciplinary action under Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2) are justified.
Second, if bad faith conduct during the litigation gives rise to
an award of attorney's fees under section 78-27-56, the attorney
also may be subject to discipline under Disciplinary Rule 7102(A)(1).128 Under that provision, an attorney shall not "[f]ile a
suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take
other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."12*
Two points should be made about that provision. First, not
only is the attorney subject to discipline for knowingly violating
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(l), but he also is liable for reckless failure to discover his client's improper purpose for bringing suit.130
The statute uses an objective standard to determine whether an
action is taken "merely to harass or injure," namely, whether its
tendency to do so is obvious.181 Second, although the statute's
scope seems narrow, because the action must be taken "merely" to
harass or injure another, an award of fees under section 78-27-56
will indicate that that standard has been satisfied in a broader
124.

102(A)(2)
125.
126.
127.
128.

REVISED RULES, OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE UTAH STATE BAR DR

7»

(1977).
Cady, 671 P.2d at 151.
Tacoma, 72 Wash. 2d at 458, 433 P.2d at 904; see Cady, 671 P.2d at 151-52.
See supra note 86.
REVISED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE UTAH STATE BAR DR

7-

102(A)(1) (1977).
129. Id.
130. The attorney shall not "take . . . action . . . when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another." Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id.
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range of circumstances. Because the standard of liability under
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(l) is objective, it will be difficult for an
attorney to answer in defense of his action that his subjective purpose for pursuing a cause of action that has been held frivolous
under section 78-27-56 was for a reason other than to "harass or
maliciously injure" the other party. Thus, in many circumstances,
an award of attorney's fees under section 78-27-56 for pursuit of a
frivolous claim coupled with bad faith conduct during the litigation
will provide a basis for a disciplinary proceeding under Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(l).
D. Section 78-27-56 and the Erie Doctrine
A final issue not addressed by the Cady court is whether the
new Utah bad faith attorney's fees statute should apply in federal
diversity cases under the Erie doctrine.132 If section 78-27-56 is interpreted to be equivalent to the federal bad faith exception, that
question may be purely academic.1" If the award of attorney's fees
under a statute such as section 78-27-56 is a substantive right of
damages, the state statute should be applied when a federal court
sits in diversity.184 Otherwise, the federal court would be free to
disregard the statute and follow federal practice.
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,195 the
United States Supreme Court indicated that state laws granting or
denying the right to attorney's fees that reflect substantial state
policies, and that do not run counter to federal statutes or rules of
court, should be followed when a federal court sits in diversity.136
Therefore, at first glance it would seem that a federal court would
be bound to apply the Utah statute when it sits in diversity. The
Utah State Legislature deliberately passed a statute that changed
settled prior law,137 indicating that section 78-27-56 reflects a substantial policy of Utah and reflects legislative intent to grant a sub132. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
133. However, if the Utah statute is interpreted as requiring bad faith to have pervaded the entire litigation, and awards may not be based on bad faith conduct during the
litigation, the Utah statute would be a narrower exception to the American rule than the
federal bad faith exception. See supra notes 69-70, 100-102 and accompanying text.
134. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975)
(suggesting that federal courts in diversity cases should follow state statutes allowing or
denying awards of attorney's fees).
135. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
136. Id. at 259 n.31.
137. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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stantive right. In Wetzel v. Goldsmith (In re Comstock),1** however, the federal bankruptcy court for the district of Idaho held
that an Idaho statute similar to the Utah bad faith attorney's fees
statute139 would not apply in a diversity case, despite the Supreme
Court's statement in Alyeska.140 The court reasoned that the Idaho
bad faith statute "does not grant a substantive right for additional
relief in specific actions. It deals instead with the inherent right of
courts to control, when circumstances demand, vexatious practices
before them."141 The award of attorney's fees under section 78-2756, as indicated by use of the word "may," is discretionary with the
court.142 It is difficult to argue that one has a substantive right to
damages when the award of fees is discretionary.
The distinction between substantive and procedural laws,
however, "was never intended to serve as a talisman" for answering
Erie questions.143 Rather, an Erie question must be answered by
considering "the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws."144 Both the federal judiciary and Utah courts may award attorney's fees for bad faith litigation. Application of the federal bad
faith exception, therefore, will not encourage forum shopping. If
the bad faith conduct occurs prior to the litigation, a court could
award attorney's fees under either federal145 or Utah law.140 Further, it is not likely that the choice to use a federal forum will be
made based on a party's bad faith conduct during litigation because that conduct will not have been manifested until after the
forum choice is made. Finally, neither the character nor result of
the litigation will materially differ if the federal bad faith exception is used.147 Small variations in the situations in which attorney's fees for bad faith litigation are awarded do not "raise the sort
of equal protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie"149
138. 16 Bankr. 206 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981).
139. See IDAHO CODE § 12-121 (1979), limited by IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(e)(1).
140. In re Comstock, 16 Bankr. at 209-10.
141. Id. at 209.
142. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
143. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (for purposes of the Erie
doctrine, "[i]t is . . . immaterial whether statutes of limitations are characterized as substantive or procedural. . .") (quoted language is drawn from Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965)).
144. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
145. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
146. See Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).
147. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 467.
148. Id. at 468.
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Thus, section 78-27-56 probably should not be applied in diversity
cases, and federal courts should be free to use the federal bad faith
exception instead.
V.

CONCLUSION

Utah's bad faith attorney's fees statute is a narrow exception
to the American rule. The court can award fees only to a prevailing
party, and only after finding that the opposing party has both asserted a frivolous claim or defense and has acted in bad faith. Once
those findings are made, however, the judge has substantial discretion. He may make an award of partial attorney's fees. He also
may assess the award against the opposing counsel rather than the
opposing party. Courts should not hesitate to use their power
under the statute once its elements are satisfied. Bad faith litigation is a burden on both courts and prevailing parties, and the legislature has wisely sought to discourage such practices.
R. GERARD LUTZ
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Defendants. ]

Plaintiff, by and through his attorney, Dennis R. James of
Morgan & Hansen, submits the following Memorandum in support of
his Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order pursuant to Rule
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and in support of
his Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
FACTS
This Court in its Judgment on Jury Verdict submitted by

Attorney Larry R. Keller and purportedly signed by the Court on
April 2 or April 3, 1990, ordered Plaintiff to pay attorney's
fees to the Defendant William Turner in an amount in excess of
$5,000.

Plaintiff

has brought

a Motion

pursuant

to Rule

60(b)(7) and Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requesting that the Court reconsider this order for fees.
ARGUMENT
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . .
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: • . * (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
Plaintifffs request for this Court to reconsider its award
of fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (bad faith action) is
based upon the arguments as set forth below.

For purposes of

clarity and in order to present this Memorandum as a Verified
Memorandum, it is set forth in first person format by Plaintifffs
counsel, Dennis R. James.
POINT 1
The Order for Fees Is Contrary to the Court's
Closing Pleci to the Parties
to "Bury the Hatchet" and
to Not Pursue Post-trial Motions
The Court, at the close of trial and after dismissal of the
jury, lectured to the parties to this litigation.
11203M.PL
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The Court

counseled all parties that it was time to "bury the hatchet" and,
although the Court acknowledged that it had earlier suggested
that it would entertain motions for fees, the Court expressed a
hope that such motions would not be brought.

Subsequent to

trial, I devoted a significant amount of time counseling with
Plaintiff to follow the Court's admonition.
I made an offer to Defendants1 counsel that I would not
pursue motions for costs and fees if they did not.

Defendants'

counsel represented to me that if Plaintiff dropped his criminal
action, it would go a long way in showing Plaintiff's good faith
and would reduce the incentive of the insurance companies they
represented to seek fees*
I counseled Plaintiff to this effect and assumed this matter
to be at an end*

I was shocked to receive phone calls from Larry

Keller - and George Naegle wherein they represented that Rod
Dansie had been in contact with the County Attorney or his Deputy
Attorneys and had insisted that they carry forward with the
criminal action*

They represented that Rod Dansie had told the

County Attorneys that the reason he had been unsuccessful in the
civil matter was because his attorney had not performed well
enough against Mr. Keller.

Mr. Keller and Mr. Naegle said that

since it appeared Mr. Dansie wasn't going to quit, the insurance
companies were insisting that they go forward with their motions
11203M.PL

3

for fees.
I called Mr. Dansie who denied the representations of Mr.
Keller and Mr. Naegle

I then contacted Richard S. Sheppard,

Division Chief at the Salt Lake County Attorneyfs Office to see
if Rod Dansie had contacted him since the conclusion of the civil
trial, or if Rod had contacted any of the Deputy County Attorneys
under Mr. Sheppard who had any possible connection, past or
present, with the Dansie criminal matter.

After reviewing his

phone log and after questioning his Deputy Attorneys, he reported
back to me that Rod Dansie had not been in contact with anyone at
the County Attorney's Office to the best of their records and
recollection since the conclusion of the civil trial on February
14, 1990.
I

contacted Rod Dansie about his

criminal matter forward.

intent to carry the

He said he had none, but thought that

he had no control over the County Attorney's Office once the
Complaint had been filed.

I arranged, with Rod's consent, a

meeting with Dick Sheppard.

Rod and I met with him on Friday,

March 2,1990 and explained the situation and our concerns and
desires, and he agreed to dismiss the criminal action.
I called Mr. Naegle and Mr. Keller to report that the
criminal action would be dismissed the following Monday.

They

had already commenced their motions for fees and in one of my
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most disappointing experiences as an attorney in eleven years of
practice, they insisted on carrying their motions forward.

They

represented that the insurance companies were insisting that they
do so. I say disappointing because the decision to further "stir
the water11 in this matter was, to some degree, based upon the
outright lie that Rod Dansie had insisted on the criminal matter
going forward and because bringing such motions was contrary to
the spirit of conciliation and brought to naught all of my time
and efforts in working with Rod on a new, less combative course
of action in his life.
If

equities

are

a

factor

at

all

in

the

Court's

determination, the good that can possibly come from Rod Dansie
being made to pay, if it is even possible, $5,000 to William
Turner's insurance company is grossly outweighed by the harm that
will result. Not only will all of my efforts with Rod be undone,
but I see terrible potential damage to a family.

The Dansies

were "beat up11 badly enough through this trial.

Many lessons

were indelibly imprinted on their minds.

There were terrible

financial costs in a home where they could not be afforded and
even worse, there were severe emotional costs.
As

for

legal grounds, the transcript

of Rod

Dansiefs

testimony which has been ordered and which will supplement this
Memorandum as soon as it is available, clearly reflects that his
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action

against William Turner was not brought

in bad

faith.

Perhaps it was without merit, but it was not brought in bad
faith.

(See Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149.)

The Defendants, contrary to the picture that was attempted
to be painted, were not innocent victims of this litigation.
This is equally true of William Turner, a man willing to rig his
water line to bypass the meter because he felt Public Service
Commission-approved rates were unconstitutional, a man willing to
bring a counterclaim alleging that Rod Dansie regularly files
lawsuits similar to this one, but who, in his deposition, was
unable to give a single example of such actions (see pages 58 and
59 of William Turner's deposition), a man willing to sign an
affidavit under oath that he was placed in immediate apprehension
of his personal safety by the waving of the pan, but who then
gave opposite testimony in his deposition and at trial as he
attempted to hold on to two conflicting positions, that he was
never close enough to Rod to assault him but that he was close
enough to Rod to be assaulted.

An innocent victim is not someone

who marches down the street with an angry mob and adds to the
apprehension of the situation by making a threatening, inciting
statement to the effect, "We've got you now, Rod."
This is a plea to the Court to reconsider its award of
attorney's fees in this matter.
11203M.PL
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eliminate them completely, then the plea is to reduce them
significantly,

especially

in light of

the

fact that Larry

Keller's bills accompanying his affidavit clearly include time
devoted

to his pursuit

of a

counterclaim

which

cannot be

considered in an award of fees under U.C.A. § 78-27-56.

His

bills include, among other things, time devoted to preparation of
the counterclaim, the entire trial time, and time devoted at the
depositions of Defendants whose depositions I took for the
purpose of seeking the dismissal of their counterclaims.
asking for credit at

He is

$115 per hour which is far in excess of the

standard rate for insurance defense work in the State of Utah.
If the Court is insistent on holding to its decision to
award fees against Mr. Dansie, I would request a reconsideration
of the Court's decision with respect to awarding an equal amount
of fees in favor of Mr. Dansie for having had to defend against
Mr. Turner's counterclaim that was clearly without merit and
brought in bad faith.

(See my Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendants' Request for Costs and Motion for Attorney's Fees and
in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees.)
DATED this

6

day of April, 1990.

IS R. JAMES
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STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Under oath, Dennis R. James states that he prepared the

preceding Memorandum and that the factual allegations which he
made therein are true and correct, to the best of his knowledge.

/iL^^v./v S vL*
IS R. JAMES//

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

(p

day of April,

1990.

NC/CARY PUBLYC^

Residing atz/kjuu?
My Commission Expires:

Jf/fo / *>

11203M.PL

8

.

~

^

Utj*^

^6«o

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I certify that on this

day of April, 1990 a true and

correct copy of the foregoing instrument was hand-delivered to
the following named individuals:
Larry R. Keller
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
George T. Naegle
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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DENNIS R. JAMES, No. 1642
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 South Main Street
Kearas Building, Eighth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
J. RODNEY DANSIE, individually
and as guardian ad litem for
TIFFANY DANSIE,

]
I

AFFIDAVIT OF
DENNIS R. JAMES

Plaintiff,

vs.
JOHN C. THOMAS, JOE TOTORICA,
ELVIRA TOTORICA, KENNETH
NORTON, WILLIAM TURNER,
THOMAS B. SHIRLEY,

ji
I

Civil No.

880908191

Judge Leonard H. Russon

Defendants..
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Dennis R. James, being first duly sworn, deposes and states
as follows:
1*
That I never received and to this date have not
received a copy of the proposed Judgment submitted by attorney
Larry Keller in behalf of his clients, John C- Thomas,, Joe
Totorica, Elvira Totarica, William Turner, and Thomas B. Shirley *,
2.
That I have questioned others in the law office of
Morgan & Hansen, including Stephen G. Morgan, with respect to the
receipt of a copy of said proposed Judgment, and no one is aware
of ever receiving a copy of the proposed Judgment.
3.
My motivation in taking the depositions of all of the

Defendants was to build a defense and hopefully obtain the
dismissal of their counterclaims•
DATED this
T
day of April, 1990.
MORGAN & HANSEN

^A.

<*V

ENNTS R. JAMES^y 7
Attorneys for £La4ntiffs

STATE OF UTAH
7 SS.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE. )
is *Q
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
1990.

day of April,

mr.Tr
» A \~
NOTARY PUBLI'
^siding at^Jfw/nvl
CdL
My Commission E x p i r e s : :
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINg
I certify that on this
7
day of April, 1990 a true and
correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed by firstclass mail, postage prepaid, to the following named individuals:

Larry R. Keller
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
George T. Naegle
RICHARD, BRANDT, MILLER &. NELSON
Key Bank Tower Suite 700
50 South Main
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

•£*&,
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